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Abstract 
“Each night the men look so surprised 
I change my sex before their eyes 
Tell me if you can 
What makes a man a man” 
 
Charles Aznavour 
“What Makes a Man a Man” (Comme ils disent) 
 
In 2013, the Victorian government reportedly invalidated the marriage 
of Melbourne musician, Paige Phoenix.  Phoenix (a female to male 
transsexual) and his wife had been married on the basis of his 
passport, since his birth certificate recorded his birth gender, female. 
 
The lack of consistency between Victorian and Commonwealth law 
surrounding marriage and the required documentation warrants a re-
examination of the landmark decision of Re Kevin in the Full Court of 
the Family Court.  The Full Court affirmed Chisolm J’s conclusion that 
the words “man and woman” in the Marriage Act bore their “ordinary 
contemporary meaning”, and that this “includes post-operative 
transsexuals as men and/or women in accordance with their sexual 
reassignment”. 
 
The law of marriage witnesses not a simple bilateral conflict, between, 
for example, crudely drawn conservative and radical approaches, or 
between simple unambiguous categories of an underlying binary: 
man|woman.  Rather, it represents a clash of many understandings of 
the world.  “Man” (and correspondingly, “woman”) – though 
superficially uncontentious and self-explanatory in the majority of 
situations – are uncategorisable at the margins.  In the courtroom, a 
conservative and monolithic Christianity-based ethos opposes the 
expansive and inclusive suggestions of the socio-empathic.   But 
lurking in the shadows (and prayed in aid by both sides) is the shadow 
of the scientist.    
 
Lurking there, too, is an uneasy tension between alternative 
alternatives, emanating from the problematisation of degrees of 
surgical intervention (“to cut or not to cut”?) and the comfortable 
assumptions of behaviours stereotypically, and arguably arbitrarily, 
associated with gender roles.  Kevin, it seemed, had eschewed the 
Barbie doll in favour of the toy sword and the plastic gun, his new 
identity evidenced by a preference for ““footy, soccer and cricket, and 
rid[ing] BMX bikes”.  In at least one sense, the decision in Re Kevin 
offers no more sophisticated an analysis of the lived reality of trans 
than Aznavour’s ecdysiast fag  - not trans, but un travesti: 
 
“I shop and cook and sew a bit 
Though mum does too, I must admit 
I do it better” 
 
Despite the apparent clarity of the Full Court decision in Re Kevin, and 
its decoupling of marriage from the binary stranglehold imposed by 
Hyde v Hyde and Corbett, the (un)rising of Phoenix and the 
discomfiting assumptions of gender-associated behaviours leaves 
trans marriage uncomfortably indeterminate, susceptible to political 
crosswinds which threaten its undoing. 
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introduction 
 
This journey through Re Kevin is based on three observations.  The first is 
that in the area of trans issues, judicial decision-making now reflects a 
different approach to that which dominated legal discourse in the 1970s, when 
Corbett  laid down the definition of “woman” for the purposes of marriage.  
The modern decisions – mostly characterised by decisions of other common 
law jursidictions,i and the decision of in Re Kevin – have been more readily 
informed by relevant psychological and social factors than their predecessors. 
 
Secondly, while desirable, the inclusion of a range of theoretical or social 
observations as the substratum of decision-making threatens to produce a 
range of conflicts through a reliance on idiosyncratic and subjective material.  
Moreover, the legal flirtation with the scientific – the quest for objective reality 
– introduces tensions when the scientific resolution does not map well to 
traditional legal solutions. 
 
And finally, there remains a resistance to trans marriage – significantly, within 
the legal and governmental community - which manifests in violence in a 
Foucualdian sense: 
 
The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of 
the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the social worker-
judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and 
each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his 
gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements.(Foucault, 1977, 
304) 
 
Trans marriage remains conflicted within Australian law: in 2013, the Victorian 
government reportedly “invalidated” the marriage of a Melbourne musician, 
Page Phoenix, who had been married on the basis of his passport (reflecting 
his post-transition gender as male), while his birth bertificate recorded his birth 
gender, female (Kellaway, 2014).  According to the decision in Re Kevin, 
affirmed on appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, Page Phoenix 
should be free to marry on the basis of his post-transition gender. 
 
a tale of three epistemes 
 
The law of transgender witnesses not a simple bilateral conflict between 
crudely drawn conservative and radical approaches, but a clash of three 
views of, and understandings of, the world.  In the courtroom, a conservative 
and monolithic Judeo-Christian ethos opposes the expansive and inclusive 
suggestions of the socio-empathic.   Yet lurking in the shadows is the shadow 
of the scientist.   
 
By way, then, of further introduction, I want to let another’s voice articulate the 
central question of Re Kevin (Aznavour, 1972): 
 
My mum and I we live alone 
A grand apartment is our home 
In Fairhome Towers 
I have to keep me company 
Two dogs, a cat, a parakeet 
Some plants and flowers 
I help my mother with the chores 
I wash, she dries, I do the floors 
We work together 
I shop and cook and sew a bit 
Though mum does  too, I must admit 
I do it betterii 
 
This description of simple domestic life prepares us for the question posed by 
Aznavour, “What makes a man a man?”iii 
 
There is a superficial attraction in letting Aznavour sing the central question of 
Re Kevin.  The literal meaning of the question is precisely that which must 
engage the court’s mind – and the question, in both instances, is framed 
outside the comfy assumptions of forensic orthodoxy associated with 
heterosexual relationships.  It is formed, rather, in the marginalised sub-
cultures of les etranger, whose voices might (it might be thought) unite in 
opposition to the monolithic, but which actually manifest in a polyvocal 
resistance. 
 
A second glance at these two cultures, however, might cause us to doubt the 
wisdom of letting Aznavour speak for Kevin.  What, after all, does the 
experience of Aznavour’s ageing, camped-up drag-queen – a homosexual 
transvestite whose self-image is revealingly (if naively and stereotypically) 
conceived in his outperforming his mother (with whom he still lives!) in the 
classically female role of homemaker.   How much common cultural space do 
the outré localised epistemes of Aznavour’s ecdysiast fag share with Kevin’s 
struggle with his own, apparently ineluctable, nature?  Kevin had eschewed 
the Barbie doll in favour of the rich phallic imagery of the the toy sword and 
the plastic gun (Re Kevin, 49). 
 
setting the (epi)cene 
 
Re Kevin arrives in the Family Court because Kevin and Jennifer have 
married.  The nature of Kevin’s legal person, however, was problematic.  In 
NSW, he is formally recognised, to the limits of that State’s jurisdiction, as a 
man.  He holds a birth certificate recording that as legal fact.  Kevin is a post-
operative transsexual.  Although the degree of surgical re-assignment is 
relatively low, the extent of his surgical intervention is not an issue before the 
court.   
 
Kevin disclosed to the marriage celebrant that, while his birth certificate reads 
“male”, it recorded not his “birth sex” but his post-operative assigned sex.  
NSW law, while allowing for the re-issue of a certificate harmonised with post-
transition gender, prescribes that the legal use of the certificate in extra-
jurisdictional transactions is limited.  Quite clearly, it does not provide 
conclusive legal proof of the sex of its holder for the purposes of the Marriage 
Act 1961 (Cth).   
 
The celebrant nonetheless performed a cerermony of marriage complying in 
all respects (save possibly one) with the requirements of the Marriage Act.  
 The Marriage Act defines marriage in terms reflecting Lord Penzance’s 
description of marriage as “the voluntary union of a man and a woman to the 
exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life” (Marriage Act, s5).  
“Man” and “woman” are not defined in the Act – hence the need, in Kevin’s 
case, for judicial consideration of this most basic characteristic of humanity.   
 
The fundamental nature of marriage, in the Hyde and Hyde was not in 
question in Re Kevin.  The complications of same-sex marriage were not 
invoked.  It’s just that “man” (and correspondingly, “woman”) – though 
superficially uncontentious and self-explanatory in the majority of situations – 
become uncategorisable at the margins.   
 
Similarly, the impact of “incomplete” re-assignment is deliberately left out of 
the analysis by mutual consent.iv  The sequence of re-assignment undergone 
by Kimberley in becoming Kevin included surgical interventions which had the 
effect of “defeminising” Kimberley. She had undergone a radical 
hysterectomy, bilateral öophorectomy and bilateral mammary liposuction.  
She (now he) had also undergone endocrine treatment which produced a 
“masculine” balance of sex-related hormones, asserting itself in the form of 
observable secondary sexual characteristics consistent with maleness.  Vocal 
changes, male patterns of body and facial hair stamped Kevin’s appearance 
to the world as a man (to the extent that, and in contradistinction to the 
discardable faux-feminine appointments of Aznavour’s character) everyday 
life was possible, for Kevin, only by the adoption of an uncontradicted and 
undiscardable masculine persona.   
 
Conversely, Aznavour’s stripper’s appearance as woman is, self-confessedly, 
a deception, revealed in the climax of the dance: 
 
I do a very special show 
Where I am nude from head to toe 
After stripteasing 
Each night the men look so surprised 
I change my sex before their eyes 
Tell me if you can 
What makes a man a man. 
 
This is the vaudevillean ecdysiasis – the discarding of the paraphernalia of the 
feminine is revealed (literally) as illusory – a magician’s trick of smoke and 
mirrors (such is the ambience of Parisian clubs) – a trompe de loil  of couture, 
coiffure and maquillage.  Now you don’t see it – now you do.   
 
the domain of the possible 
 
The deception, though, has temporal and functional limits:  after the show 
(and after the afterparty): 
 
My masquerade comes to an end 
And I go home to bed again 
Alone and friendless. 
 
Such performativity maps to Butler’s “masquerade” of gender enforced in a 
“subtle and political” domain, subject to the “splittings, self parody, self-
criticism” which, through their hyperbolic nature, reveal the “fundamentally 
phantasmatic status” of the illusion of geneder (Butler, 1990, 187).v  For 
Kevin, however, the meta-discursive commitment implicit in re-assignment 
removed from the domain of the possible a return to the quotidian operations 
of his pre-intervention sex – there is (now) no masquerade to come to an end.  
His  beard, his physique, his voice preclude any vacillation before the 
wardrobe or the toilet door.  As Chisolm J observed, “his male secondary 
characteristics were such that he would have been subject to ridicule if he had 
attempted to appear in public dressed as a woman . . . [and he could not 
have] attempted to use a women’s toilet” (Re Kevin at [36]). 
 
Kevin, however, had not proceeded with any form of surgical 
“masculinisation”.  Although defeminised, he had not undergone constructive 
phalloplasty or testicular prostheses. For forensically strategic reasons, 
neither side had raised the extent of assignment.  For Kevin, the argument 
that he was a man would seemingly be undercut by the absence of (even 
surgically) created male organs.  For both, the precedential value of a 
decision so easily distinguished on its facts would be greatly diminished. 
 
At its most basic then, Re Kevin might be conceived as an exercise in 
statutory interpretation.  The terms “man” and “woman”, no longer en passant, 
would be subjected to the scrutiny of law.  Set in opposition are the 
conservative assumptions about marriage and sex articulated both expressly 
and implicitly by Lord Justice Ormond in the leading case on the question, Re 
Corbett and a more sophisticated assessment of the underlying meaning of 
maleness. 
 
That conservative frame can be focussed in an widely-quoted passage from 
Corbett.  In determining what makes a man a man (or a woman a woman), 
Lord Justice Ormrod considered: 
 
…the criteria must, in my judgement, be biological, for even the most 
extreme degree of transsexualism in a male or the most severe 
hormonal imbalance which can exist in a person with male 
chromosomes, male gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a 
person who is naturally capable of performing the essential role of a 
woman in marriage. 
 
Absent a role which is paradoxially both essentialist and utilitarian, the 
transsexual (described by Lord Justice Ormord with barely concealed disgust 
for the perverse anatomical interplay of the Corbett bourdoir (Cossey, per 
Martens J , 644)) is cast as the new leper, re-iterating the “game of exclusion” 
which, as Foucault observed, had been played out over two- to three hundred 
years in an oddly similar fashion, re-targeted on the poor, the vagrant, the 
prisoner, the “alienated” … les etranger remodelled to the fashion of the age 
(Foucault, 2006, 6; cf Butler, 20 
01, 621).  The reluctance of courts to traverse the “many fine metaphysical 
arguments lurking about here involving desire and being, the essence of life 
and the power of mind over physics” has been defended by reference to a 
narrow positivism:  “… courts are wise not to wander too far into the misty 
fields of sociological philosophy.  Matters of the heart do not always fit neatly 
within the narrowly defined perimeters of statutes, or even existing social 
mores. Such matters though are beyond this court's consideration” (Littleton, 
235). 
 
The approach in Corbett appears to construct a continuum of deviant 
sexuality, decoupled from normally-constructed masculinity, through mere 
hormonal imbalance out as far as “the most extreme” degrees of 
transsexualism (Corbett, 105).  Alternative constructions of maleness – indicia 
beyond the immediately definable triumvirate of gonads, genitals and 
chromosomes -  were rejected, despite far more extensive taxonomies of 
developmental variables of sex having been identified, for example, by Money 
in 1968 (Fletcher, 540).vi  Most particularly, the psychological and the psycho-
social were condemned undifferentially as more than mere oddity or 
aberration (although there is an air of the freak-show): they were constructed 
as mental illness  - unable to transcend the Freudian “anatomy as destiny” 
which informed LJ Ormrod’s forensic distinction between the sexes (see 
Freud, 6).  Presumably, the transvestite (typified by Aznavour as a mincing 
homosexual mimicking femininity) and the “true-transsexual” (whose libido 
object is a person of the opposite (perceived) sex)) are nonetheless united in 
law by the quirk of birth anatomy and their departure from the (hetero-) 
normatively orthodox.  Transsexualism (even in its pre-operative 
manifestation) is not a homosexual phenomenon, but rather a heterosexuality 
decoupled from, and confounded by, the implications of gross anatomy, and 
beyong the scope of the legal imagination.    
 
Behind the façade is the assumption of an unrelieved bimodal state of human 
sexuality.  Male and female -  concepts of impeccable Scriptural authenticity 
(Genesis 1:27) - are reflected in the reified polarities of a two-valued legal 
taxonomy, themselves manifestations of Foucault’s construction of the co-
ercive suppression of the complexity of human identity by modernity (see 
Wilkins, 181, 200), or the (arbitrary) “frozen frames” of Hocquenghem’s 
“unbroken and polyvocal flux” (Herzer, cited in Eribon, 63).  Corbett’s reliance 
on expert medical evidence pre-supposes (or at least pretends) that the bio-
logic of scientific taxonomy parallels a sexual binary opposition.  Such a bio-
logic, within the legal imaginary, is constructed as an inherently stable 
phenomoenon, as opposed to, for example, an “identity tenuously constituted 
in time … instituted through a stylized repetition of acts” (Butler, 1988, 519). 
 
But the medical evidence was, in one sense, of anything but the binary.  The 
scientific view, expressed in the evidence in Corbett, was that medical 
evaluation was not directed to “determining” which of the two values an 
individual was – that is the realisation of a forensic classicification harmonised 
with a binary biological determinacy. Rather, it spoke to the ultra-pragmatic 
(and humanitarian) assessment of which of the social roles associated with 
those reified concepts best suited the bio-reality of an individual’s specific 
positioning in  a mulitvalent biological schema.  Toilet doors may come in only 
two forms; people don’t.  In Foucault’s terms (cf Wilkin, 182), the diversity of 
the human condition (and both self- and medical reportage) is reduced to 
legal monologue.  The bipolarity conveniently morphs from medical 
pragmatism into the simplified black and white legal-logical space 
underpinning not just Corbett, but the sequence of subsequent cases which 
remained wedded to a binary forensic determination which contradicts 
biological diversity. 
 
Corbett’s presupposition of “true sex” leads to a primacy of ordinariness in the 
forensic restructuring of human sexual identity – humans ordinarily emerge at 
birth as uncomplicatedly male or female, rendering the ascription of sexual 
identity “so self-evident as to be trivial” (Fletcher, 536), to the extent that that 
“[e]very schoolchild, even of tender years is confident that he or she can tell 
the difference” (Littleton, [1]). The assumption is that even the extra-ordinary 
must be consistent with binary organisation, or at least that it can be made 
(through an act of analytical forensic violence) to conform to this legal fiction.  
Kevin must, it seems, live in the profoundly satirical world of Crouch’s 
Gendercator, where  
… [s]ex roles and gender expression are rigidly binary and enforced by 
law and social custom ... one where butch women and sissy boys are no 
longer tolerated – gender variants are allowed to choose their gender, 
but they must choose one and follow its rigid constraints’’ (Crouch, 
2006). 
 Yet it is in the extra-ordinary that the validity (or at least the limits) of forensic 
ascription needs to be tested.  
 
In Corbett, the indicia were selected ostensibly because they represented  an 
exhaustive set of anatomical dimorphia, unambiguously differentiating 
individuals where congruent.  All else was consigned to the aberrant – either 
the forensic nether-world of intersex, or the psychopathology of deviant sexual 
orientation.  In Re Kevin, though, the cosy security, of Corbett’s bimodality 
yields to at least the possibility that sexual identity might not be settled at 
birth, nor confined wholly by Lord Justice Ormrod’s troika of chromosomes, 
gonads and genitals.  Most particularly, the self-ascription of the transsexual 
to their counter-gender, dismissed as mental illness in Corbett, has been 
recharacterised as something beyond psychopathology – beyond even the 
psychological to something rooted profoundly in the physiological.  In the 
1998 case of  X Y and Z v UK, the ECHR had recognised the view that: 
 
…transsexuality is not merely a psychological disorder but has a 
physiological basis in the structure of the brain. 
 
The medical evidence, published by Zhou et al in Nature in 1995, pointed 
specifically to a site of physiological dimorphic differentiation within the brain, 
deeply implicated in the phenomenon of transexualism, identified as lying in 
the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (Zhou, 68ff).  The spectre of 
psychopathy is relieved by the acknowledgement that “transsexuals [might] be 
right in their belief that their sex was wrongly judged at the moment of birth”, 
and the existence of sexually dimorphic neurological structures which point 
inexorably (or at least as cogently as karyotype, gonads or genitals) to one of 
the polar states of sex (Zhou, 69).vii 
 
This  evidence was accepted by Chisolm J as reflecting the existence of a 
fourth sexually dimorphic structure within human anatomy.  But, if the three 
determinative indicia of Corbett have simply been amplified, then ultimately 
the balance of judicial decision-making remains largely unaltered. Corbett’s 
trinity resolves into a quartet, but that merely shifts the point of ambiguity to a 
different site.  A fourth element may extend the potential range of non-
congruence (so that an individual who is congruent across Corbett’s indicia 
may well be found non-congruent across all four), but in itself does nothing to 
change the underlying oppositions.  A new physiological “test” emerges, re-
inforcing the anatomical primacy of Corbett.   
 
of domestic chores and macho sports 
 
Kevin was born (within the static formula of Corbett) unambiguously female.  
At birth, the (then) Kimberley presented with congruent observable dimorphic 
forms. Her gonads, genitals and karyotype pointed uncomplicatedly to the 
birth of a non-anomalous girl. 
 
Between birth and puberty, however, the comfortable assumptions of gender 
identity slipped.  Kimberley, though Corbett-congruent and observably female, 
nevertheless began to demonstrate behavioural “anomalies”.  Physiology (or 
at least the confined construct created by Corbett’s analysis) failed to yield an 
identity consistent with anatomical destiny.   
 
A range of evidence was presented to the court about Kimberly’s behavour: a 
male cousin testified that they would play “footy, soccer and cricket, and ride 
BMX bikes on family outings”. Close friends and relatives gave consistent 
evidence of his predilection for the aggressive play of male children (rather 
than the co-operative social play of girls)  (Re Kevin, 48-66).   
 
Contemporary acquaintances described the current Kevin – his appearance, 
physique, mannerisms, speech, attitudes and interests as “expressing his 
maleness” – epitomised, perhaps, by a friend’s characterisation as “a typical 
Aussie bloke” (Re Kevin, 62).  His adult persona was lauded as a “fine 
husband and father”, even to the point of the judgement of his mother-in-law:  
there was “no other man, anywhere, who I would prefer to have as my 
daughter’s husband” (Re Kevin, 60). 
 
But it is this body of evidence which lies at the source of the another tension – 
which creates a paradox (if not at the individual level, but at the level of sexual 
politics.)  The characterisation of individuals by reference to sexual 
stereotypes  - the heteronormative ruggedness of masculinity as counterpoint 
to the gentleness of the feminine – has long been abandoned as a valid basis 
for inference from behaviour to identity (Cover, 85).   Homosexuals do not 
inevitably conform to the stereotypical traits of Aznavour’s ecdysiast fag, nor 
lesbians to the boilersuited butch of TV dramas. The idiosyncratic 
manifestations of gender – the acutal masquerade of Aznavour, or the 
masquerade imposed by the legal imaginary on Kevin, invite a bilateral form 
of the question posed by Butler: does “masquerade conceal a femininity 
(/masculinity) that might be seen as genuine or authentic, or [is] masquerade 
… the means by which femininity (/masculiniity) and the contests over its 
“authenticity” are produced?” (Butler, 1990, 204: n18). 
 
couture, coiffure & macquillage 
 
Kevin is to be distinguished from the vaudevillian transvestite stripper:  
Aznavour’s entertainer is (quintessentially) performer.  His stage persona 
persists as stereotype after any after-party performance: 
 
We love to pull apart someone 
And spread some  gossip just for fun 
Or start a rumour 
 
Kevin, by contrast, wears no mask – no wig.   Kevin is the embodiment of 
Prosser’s “transsexual who seek[s] very pointedly to be non-performative, to 
be constative, quite simply to be” (Prosser, 1998, 2). 
 
Yet, it is precisely these heteronormative behavioural tropes which form the 
counter-technological riposte to the forensic ascription of anatomical and 
chromosomal determinism which must be overcome if Kevin is to marry.  And 
in doing so, they become as entrenched in forensic discourse as Ormrod LJ’s 
bio-logic.  
 
Justice Chisolm’s “absurd” pre-occupation with Kevin’s childhood behaviours 
realises, and re-imagines out of the domain of the homosexual into that of the 
transsexual, Eribon’s characterisation of 19th Century analyses of the “uranist” 
as a “a personage, a past, a case history and a childhood, a character-type, a 
form of life” (Eribon, 279).  It is also, to continue with Foucault, a “morphology 
with an indiscreet anatomy” (Foucault, 1990, 43), while law’s discomfort with 
the transsexual literalises Foucault’s ascription of a “mysterious physiology” – 
outside the visual or conceptual horizon of the legal imaginary.  But it equally 
re-imagines – if not re-invigorates – the perversely prescient construction of 
the homosexual in Ulrich’s model of the “hermaphroditism of the soul”, mutatis 
mutandis  the “woman’s soul in a man’s body” (Cairns, 582, n4). 
 
conclusion:  the wounded other 
 
The reduction of human sexuality to a narrative of conformity to such 
heteronormative tropes.  
 
What is at stake in the counterpoint of law and anatomical morphology is the 
recognition of “a way of life [which] can yield a culture and an ethics”, much as 
Foucault ascribes these phenomena to “gayness” (Foucault, 1997, 138), not 
constrained to the identification with defined psychological traits, visible 
masks or the veil of the legal subject. 
 
Nobody has the right to be 
The judge of what is right for me 
Tell me if you can 
What makes a man a man. 
 
 
The inscription – or re-inscription – of legal personality onto the body of the 
transexual manifests the hermenuetical function of the judge-as-judge.  The 
confessional processes which illuminate the person behind the body – the 
self-surveillance and narrative consequence – is neither a free-standing self-
determination nor a functional discourse of the self.  For Foucault, the 
confession (the discourse of the symptom) is but a precursor to the 
surveillance and classification of a truth which cannot, politically, be known by 
the subject, but must be deciphered and as the “truth of this (now) obscure 
truth”, the listener-judge acting as the “master of a truth” laid bare and 
evaluated before a public tribunal demanding proof by a metaphorical (or 
metonymic) striptease (Foucault, 1990, 65).   
 
To the extent that such an ecdysiasis reveals the body/mind behind what is 
cynically assumed to be a mask, its roots in sterotyped behavioural signs are 
perhaps no more convincing that Aznavour’s glittering evening gown.  The 
micro-surveillance and interrogation to which the confession is subjected – a 
disciplinary project which manifests Bersani’s observation that “to be seen is 
to be policed” (Bersani, 13, 2)viii - cannot be dissociated from the production, 
mutiplication and concretisation of the legal taxonomy to which reality is 
inevitably reduced.  In doing so, the legitimation (or, perhaps, “establishment”) 
of the transsexual in the legal imaginary as a defined – or definable – 
category risks  a reversal of Hocquengham’s plea that les etranger should 
themselves “uncover the desire which we have been forced to hide” (cited in 
Eribon, 63), ceding to the court Nietzsche’s “lordly right of giving names” 
(Nietzsche, I.2). 
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i  See, for example, M v M [1991] NZFLR 337; W v W (physical inter-sex) [2001] 
Fam 111; Cossey v United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 622, Attorney-General v 
Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603. 
ii  All extracts from “What makes a Man a Man” are from the 1972 English 
translation and recording of the original French, Comme ils disent. 
iii  The question, in a forensic setting, was framed in almost identical terms in 1999 by 
Harberger, CJ in Littleton v Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223:  “This case involves the most 
basic of questions.  When is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman? 
iv The question of the delimiting point in transition between sexes is discussed in 
detail in Bellinger v Bellinger [2001] EWCA Civ 1140 at 100ff, where “The Report 
of the Inter-Departmental Working Group on Transsexual People” is considered by 
the President, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss and Robert Walker LJ  at[91]ff. 
v  It is beyond the scope of this article to engage with observations of “critical 
ambivalence” (Halberstam, 2012, 343), or the tension between “the stabilization of 
the category of woman and the undermining of the coherence of the category 
within queer theory (Halberstam, 2012, 336). 
vi  Such taxonomies (see Money, Sex Errors of the Body and Related Syndromes) are 
a point of reference in US Courts in the classification of “sex differentiation 
conditions” (see Fletcher,  540). 
vii  Wallbank sets out the three major “competing” theories of the ætiology of 
transexualism: the Non-Conflictual Psychological Theory and the The Conflictual 
Psychological Theory, both of which identify transsexualism as a pathological 
condition, differentiated  by the extent to which the former is “fixed” as a 
developmental characteristic (and thus untreatable) or persistently ambiguous (and 
thus treatable) and the Biological Theory (which identifies transsexualism as 
deriving from anatomical dimorphia (see Zhou)).  No theory is, as yet, conclusive. 
(Wallbank, Part IV, How Do you Explain a Problem Like Transsexualism?). 
viii  Bersani’s analysis is, of course, directed to homosexuality (“gayness”), yet the 
observation remains apposite across the spectrum of human sexual identity. 
